ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
The consultative referendum on prolonging the working of the Ignalina This referendum can be qualified politically as "excessive", 3 or, rather, the situation does recall the manipulative nature of direct democracy instruments themselves. 4 The manipulative nature of this particular referendum is becoming even more evident after more detailed analysis. The referendum was superposed with regular parliamentary elections. The elections were successfully passed but the referendum was not because of the "low turnout". Out of those who participated, 91.07 % voted YES: "I approve of the extension of operation of the Ignalina Nuclear Power
Plant for a technically safe period, but not longer than completion of the construction of a new nuclear power plant". The overall result represents a successful maneuver by the Lithuanian elites: they called for a public verdict but it was ignored due to a formal argument, namely, the lack of 1.5 per cent voter turnout to call a referendum valid. 5 Naturally, one can assume that a call for a 1 should also be taken into consideration (Lithuania remaining within the Russian energy system, and perspectives on energetic independence of Lithuania).
8
The initiative to analyze the case of the Ignalina referendum was inspired by the increased amount of studies connected with lost referenda on the Constitution of Europe in France and The Netherlands. 9 The case of the Ignalina referendum could be analyzed while employing various theoretical perspectives. 10 On the one hand, the "value/ideologically" oriented branch 11 of theoretical approaches draw our attention to certain values raised in the context of referenda. The application of the rational-choice-based perspective 12 focuses on actors' behavior. Moreover, various levels of analysis can be applied, namely macro-, meso-, and individual-based. Ivanovas, S. Rakutienė, J. Tirvienė, I. Unikaitė-Jakuntavičienė).
**Comments of both campaigns, election to the Seimas and referenda, summarized. However, although not very intensely, the problem of the Ignalina Nuclear
Power Station was reflected in the media portals. Our effort to examine the chronology of this matter shows the presence of the three "waves" of the media attention towards the aforementioned problem (see Fig. 1 ).
18 Data collected during the work of the scholarly group of Lithuanian Scientific Council "Effect of nonelectoral campaigns for political processes in Lithuania" (chief L. Mažylis, participants A. Jurgelionytė, B. Ivanovas, S. Rakutienė, J. Tirvienė, I. Unikaitė-Jakuntavičienė). The referendum factors are divided into "agent-driven" and "structure-driven"
explanations by Carlos Closa. 23 As previous studies show, taking into account structural campaign factors is, in its nature, a rather difficult task. 24 As Kathleen Thelen summarizes, "it reviews some distinctions that are commonly drawn between the 'historical' and the 'rational choice' variants of institutionalism and shows that there are more points of tangency than typically assumed. However, differences remain in how scholars in the two traditions approach empirical problems." shows that the "value-based" argument that "treaties are to be followed" was important only for seven percent of the respondents. It was completely unimportant to twenty-five percent, whereas thirty-three percent of the respondents voted for "re-negotiating the Treaty". Possibly, this latter option, "re-negotiating", was actively exploited in the comments of different campaign actors/government elites. 28 It was important that Lithuanian inhabitants were aware; closing Ignalina Nuclear Power Station was an international obligation, moreover, approved by the overwhelming majority of Lithuanian electorate in the EU accession referendum in 2003. Thus agreeing by the EU to "re-negotiate" could be most welcome. The "renegotiating" agenda was formally institutionally reinforced by creating a special "senior negotiator" post. With that, into the field of political game one more actor, called "Mr. Ignalina", was introduced (see below arguments that it was an ad hoc institutional imitation "for internal use" -i.e. especially for the referendum purposes).
Following this assumption, the political campaign on extending the working of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Station (February-October 2008) was following society's position that "benefits are higher than costs" rather than staying somewhere between "it is a good thing" and "obligations are to be followed" or advocating for a safe environment, commitment to properly using EU financing or the obligation to follow international treaties.
This "value/ normative" attitude (we, the authors, believe it is an important "structural" factor) was formed during a long-lasting period, much longer lasting than the period of our research (2008). The importance of other behavioral norms was very unlikely during this campaign -these are all old arguments widely discussed since 1997.
We argue that during the referendum opposing ideas were not at the forefront of this campaign. If so, there was no possibility of the "value shift"/ "paradigmatic institutional shift", which means that it was unlikely that the values would shift during the ongoing campaign.
Further analysis should be concentrated on the actors, their access to the information channels, and possibilities to pose themselves on the background of 28 Ibid.: 108. When referring to the "official" stage of the referendum campaign, very few of the political analysts tended to call it "non-existent" at all, as it was fully "physically shielded" by a parallel election campaign. 31 There was neither any clear agreement 29 Kathleen Thelen, supra note 22. 2. There were no "paradigmatic" value/normative changes provoked by the referendum campaign. The equilibrium of costs and benefits, as well as the argument about a "minor evil" was understood by the campaign actors as deeply enrooted in the society, and there were no evident intentions to change it.
DISPUTABLE INPUT INTO DEVELOPING
3. A rather short time after the referendum, an idea emerged within the political game field, and its actors positioned themselves as active, reluctant, critical, and fluctuating.
4. Formal mechanical institutional nuances were expected to be crucial. In reality, it was a microscopic turnout deficit that became this kind of crucial factor.
Finally, the result (popular approval to YES but invalidity of referendum due to low turnout) became almost unanimously acceptable for the majority of actors involved.
5. In terms of developing a political tradition, the referendum on extending the working of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Station falls into a range of referenda expanding the field of broader political (frequently coinciding with electoral)
debates. Exploring the manipulative nature of this kind of referenda could be a fruitful perspective in pursuing further analysis here.
34 Liudas Mažylis, "Lietuvos referendumas dėl narystės Europos Sąjungoje," Politologija Nr. 2 (34) (2004).
